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Introduction

A formalist model imagines that judges and arbitrators resolve disputes in
a wholly deliberative and rationale way., The assumption is that they
identify the appropriate legal principles, objectively apply them, and
ultimately reach predictable results. This model of decision-making as
highly predictable and objective, however, is illusory.2 Judges and
arbitrators instead are more human and less mechanical-they pour more of
themselves into their cognitive processing. As Kahan indicates, they
unwittingly shape outcomes consistent with their own innate preferences.3
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THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE:

THE

ROLE OF

POLITICS IN JUDGING 1 (2010); Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What is the

Issue? 16

LEGAL THEORY 111 (2010).
2. See e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How ]udges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 1, 19-29 (2007); Tracey E. George & Taylor Grace Weaver, The Role of Personal
Attributes and Social Backgrounds on Judging, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. JUDICIAL
BEHAVIOR 286-298 (2017); Kahan et al., infra note 3, at 356-368; Holger Spamann & Lars
Klein, ]ustice is Less Blind and Less Legalistic Than We Thought: Evidence from an Expeiment with

Real 7udges, 45 J.

LEGAL STUD.

255, 255-259, 268-277 (2016); Dan M. Kahan, Culture,

Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L.

REV. 729, 731-761, 793-807 (2010) (research exploring humanness of judicial decisionmaking).
3. Dan M. Kahan et al., "Ideology" or "Situation Sense"?: An Experimental Investigation of

Motivated Reasoning and ProfessionalJudgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 356 (2016).
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"Motivated cognition" theory is an emerging model for explaining how
legal decision makers process information (such as laws and facts) and reach
their conclusions (case outcomes).4 Provocative research on judges and
motivated cognition exists;5 research on arbitrators and motivated cognition
is scarce. The model debunks the assumption that legal decision-makers are
either intentionally biased or absolutely neutral, arguing instead that this
binary framework does not adequately explain what is happening. Motivated
cognition instead conceives legal decision-making as being affected by the
fertile environmental and psychological context within which it occurs.
This article extends the motivated cognition model to the global
economic stage, probing arbitration of international business disputes of two
world powers: The United States and China. Through a first-of-its-kind
empirical study of Chinese arbitration of international business disputes, it
further develops the model by focusing on a particular kind of motivated
cognition, motivated cultural cognition.6 Motivated cultural cognition
analyzes how culture affects motivated cognition and the decision-maker's
model of justice. When applied to decision-makers with vastly different
cultures-and with mega-corporations at stake-the implications can be
massive.
Indeed, a better understanding of the international business arbitration
process is important because so many disputes between businesses of
different countries are resolved in international arbitration rather than the
courts.7

International arbitration is the "traffic cop" for the worldwide

economy and the trillions of dollars at stake. Within that ecosystem, China
is one of the biggest players in international trade and direct foreign
investment. Since the late 1980s, China has been a world star in foreign
trade and direct foreign activity8 In 2015, for instance, China was the
largest recipient of direct foreign investment in the world.9 Disputes
between Chinese and foreign parties are inevitable with all of this business
activity, and each party's resolutions are critical to ongoing trade and
investment functioning.1o
Avani Mehta Sood, Motivated Cognition in Legal ]udgments An Analytic Review, 9 ANN.
L. & Soc. Sci. 307, 307 (2013).
See id. at 318-19.
See id. at 314-15.
See Pat K. Chew, Opening the Red Door to Chinese Arbitrations:An Empirical Analysis of
CIETAC Cases 1990-2000, 22 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 241, 245-46 (2017); see also CHINESE
JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 1 (Margaret Y.K. Woo
Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011) (exploring the limitations and concerns of China's judicial
&

4.
REv.
5.
6.
7.

system).

8. Chew, supra note 7.
9. See e.g., China Overtakes U.S. for Foreign Direct Investment, BBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-31052566.
10. See DANIEL C. K. CHow, A PRIMER ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ENTERPRISES AND
PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 9-11 (1st ed. 2002) (describing range of
issues and resulting conflicts of direct foreign investment enterprises).
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When it comes to U.S.-Chinese business disputes, the parties, arbitrators,
and the Chinese International Economic Trade and Arbitration Commission
(CIETAC) all want a convenient and reasonably efficient resolution of this
dispute, but also paramount is a fair arbitration process. Both parties believe
they have sound justifiable positions. With often sizeable commitments at
stake, they want a presumptively equal playing field for all parties regardless
of their nationality."
Part I of this article explores the relationship between motivated cultural
cognition and Chinese arbitrators' decision-making.12 It investigates the
model's implications for dispute outcomes and the possible role of Chinese
arbitrators' core cultural beliefs in decision mechanisms that unwittingly
lead to their "preferred outcomes."
Based on a novel empirical study of over 1,000 Chinese arbitrations, Part
II discusses evidence of Chinese arbitrators demonstrating motivated
cultural cognition.13 It finds a relationship between the arbitrators' decisionmaking and the claimants' cultural similarity or cultural dissonance to the
Chinese arbitrators' culture. The bottom line is what appears to be an
advantage for Chinese parties and a disadvantage for foreign parties,
particularly U.S. parties. The article concludes by exploring whether "just"
results are culturally-specific, as motivated cultural cognition suggests, or if
the answer depends on who is asking the question.
II.

Motivated Cultural Cognition

A.

MOTIVATED COGNITION MODEL

Individuals are always making decision or resolving disputes. The
"motivated cognition" model posits that we are unwittingly influenced to
reach a preferred outcome.' We believe we are absolutely open-minded
about the alternatives and gathering all relevant information. Yet our
cognitive processing of the dispute unconsciously shapes our reasoning
11. See e.g., Jerome A. Cohen, Time to Fix China's Arbitration, FAR E. EcON. REV. 31, 31

(2005); Jerome A. Cohen, Settling InternationalBusiness Disputes With China-Then and Now, 47
CORNELL INT'L L. J. 555, 558-64 (2014); Frederick Brown & Catherine A. Rogers, The Role of
Arbitrationin Resolving TransnationalDisputes: A Survey of Trends in the People's Republic of China,
15 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 329, 341 (1997); William B. Grenner, The Evolution of Foreign Trade
Arbitrationin the Peoples Republic of China, 21 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 293, 311 (1988-1989);
William Heye, Forum Selection for International Dispute Resolution in China-Chinese Courts vs.
CIETAC, 27 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 535, 536 (2003-2004); Justin Hughes, Foreign
lis alibi pendens, Non-Chinese Majority Trbunals and Other Problems of Neutrality in CIETAC
Arbitration, 13 ARB. INT'L 63, 69-83 (1997) (offering practitioner's perspective); Randall
Peerenboom, Seek Truth From Facts: An Empirical Study of Enforcement ofArbitral Awards in the
PRC, 49 Am. J. COMP. L. 249 (2001) (for discussions of foreign investors' concerns).
12. See supra text accompanying note 7.
13. See supra text accompanying note 2.
14. Ziva Kunda, The Casefor Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480, 483 (1990); Sood,
supra note 4, at 308-10.
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process, drawing us to an outcome that serves some personalized interest
(the preferred outcome).
This phenomenon is demonstrated in all kinds of situations, including
how we evaluate ourselves and others, political judgments, business
judgments, and moral behavior.5 It shapes how we explain the nature,
cause, and likelihood of events. It also is evidenced in a broad array of legalrelated judgments.16

In one study, the participants are presented with a First Amendment
related case, where the law requires a finding of harm, but the content is not
legally-relevant.17 Half of the participants' facts have a nudist holding up a
pro-choice sign in favor of legalized abortion, while the other half's facts
have a nudist holding up a pro-life sign against the legalization of abortion.s
Participants impute more harm to the act of public nudity when the nudist's
position was contrary to their own abortion views (which had been measured
in a separate survey).19
Another experiment deals with a woman whose dogs maul a child to
death.20 The woman is either described as pleasant and of "good character"
(sociable, generous, and healthy) or as unpleasant and of "bad character"
(antisocial and unhealthy).21 The participants who are presented with her as
a bad character attributed more responsibility and intentionality to her than
those who are presented with her as a good character, even though her
character is unrelated to the dog-mauling incident and is a legally irrelevant
factor.22 In other research, legal judgments appeared unconsciously driven
by the decision-makers' political preferences and ideology, their cultural
commitment, and their group memberships.23 As subsequently explored,
one's cultural values can be a major determinant.24
How is motivated cognition operationalized? Researchers find that
decision-makers arrive at their desired conclusions by engaging in
inadvertently biased processes for "accessing, constructing, and evaluating
beliefs."25 For example, three such pre-conscious cognitive mechanisms that
filter what is ultimately consciously considered include: (i) "[S]elective
15. Kunda, supra note 14, at 481-83; Sood, supra note 4, at 308.
16. Sood, supra note 4, at 310-15.
17. Avani Mehta Sood & JohnM. Darley, The Plasticity ofHarm in the Service of Criminalization
Goals, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1336-42, 1348 (2012).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Janice Nadler & Mary-Hunter McDonnell, Moral Character,Motive, and the Psychology of
Blame, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 255, 285-87 (2012).
21. Id. at 285.
22. Id. at 286-87.
23. See e.g., Joshua R. Furgeson et al., Do a Law's Policy Implications Affect Beliefs About its
Constitutionality?An Experimental Test, 32 L. & Hum. BEHAv. 219, 226 (2008) (effect of political
ideology); Anca M. Miron et al., Motivated Shifting offustice Standards, 36 PERSONALITY Soc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 768, 777-76 (2010).
24. See supra note 2.
25. Sood, supra note 4, at 309; Kunda, supra note 14, at 480.
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internal searching through their memory or external searching through
available information to find existing facts, beliefs[,] or rules that support the
outcome they prefer;" (ii) "[C]reatively combin[ing] accessed knowledge to
construct new beliefs that could logically support the desired conclusion;"
and (iii) "Preference-inconsistent information is evaluated in a more critical
manner than preference-consistent information."26 As Sood continues:

Instead of either relinquishing their own sense of justice or blatantly
flouting the law, legal decision makers may engage in a motivated
construal of relevant information to achieve their desired .

. . . especially when
interpretation.27

the law leaves

.

. outcomes

room for ambiguity or

Decision-makers also engage in a kind of naive realism. They see
themselves as objective.28 They do not recognize their biases, instead seeing
others as biased. This sincere belief in their own objectivity allows them to
confirm the integrity of their decision-making. They can, in good faith,
represent to others and believe themselves that they are neutral decision
makers. Further, when decision-makers are confronted with their illusion of
objectivity, for instance, by making the preferential ideological factor
apparent, the motivated cognitive effect can be eliminated.29 Neuroscientists
using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) also find that the
regions of the brain activated by motivated cognition are not the same as
ones associated with rationale reasoning tasks, consistent with the belief that
motivated cognition is unconscious.30
B.

MOTIVATED CULTURAL COGNITION AND CHINESE ARBITRATION

Motivated cognition research finds that decision-makers' culture plays a
very important role in their decisions:' Core cultural values provide the
foundation for beliefs about what is important and prioritized; they are the
basis on which the world is perceived and processed. These beliefs directly
shape the criteria for decisions, which in turn leads to certain preferred
outcomes.
26. Sood, supra note 4, at 309-12.
27. Id.
28. See Kunda, supra note 14; Emily Balcetis & David Dunning, See What You Want to See:
Motivational Influences on Visual Perception, 91 J. PERSONALITY Soc. PSYCHOL. 612, 612-13
(2006).
29. Sood & Darley, supra note 17, at 1357.
30. See Drew Westen et al., Neural Bases of Motivated Reasoning: An fiMRI Study of Emotional
Constraints on Partisan PoliticalJudgment in the 2004 U.S. PresidentialElection, 18 J. COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 1947, 1955 (2006).
3 1. See Dan M. Kahan et al., "They Saw a Protest": Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-Conduct
Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 888-90 (2012) [hereinafter Kahan, "They Saw a Protest"];Dan
M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defense Cognition of Self-Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1,
1 (2008); Dan M. Kahan, Culture, Cognition, and Consent: Who Perceives What, and Why, in
Acquaintance-Rape Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 729, 787, 799 (2010) (prolific research by Kahan
and colleagues).
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In the particular context of Chinese arbitration, Chinese arbitrators, as
members of Chinese culture, share "core cultural values" that are the basis
for their key "societal beliefs."32 As illustrated, these values and beliefs, in
turn, shape arbitrators' positions on how disputes should be approached and
the criteria for their resolutions (decision-making mechanisms). These
cognitive processes result in their arbitration awards (outcomes), such as in
the kinds of disputes subsequently described.33
Motivated Cultural Cognition Model

Core Cuitural Values and
Associated Societa[ Beliefs
Leading to
Decision-making Mechanisms and

Preferred Outcomes
1.

Core Values and Societal Beliefs

Anthropologists and other social scientists have long studied countries'
core cultural values. They describe culture as a society's "learned system of
meanings rooted in symbols . .. language . . . and actions."34 Values are the
reference points that a culture uses to "give order and guidance to [its]
thoughts and actions."3s Various frameworks are used to conceptualize
cultural values across nations.36 Geert Hofstede is a pioneer in identifying
and researching cultural dimensions.37 Two prominent dimensions of
cultural values, recognized by Hofstede and other social scientists, are
collectivism versus individualism and hierarchical versus egalitarian
orientations.38 Motivated cultural cognition scholars find these dimensions
particularly salient in understanding legal decision-making.
3 2. Id.
33. See infra Part III.A.
34. Rebecca LeFebvre & Volker Franke, Culture Matters: Individualism vs. Collectivism in
Conflict Decision-Making, 3 SOCIETIES 128-146 at 132; Kevin Avruch & Peter W. Black, Conflict
Resolution in InterculturalSettings, in THE CONFLICT & CULTURE READER 7-14 (PAT CHEW,
ED. 2001).
35. LeFebvre & Franke, supra note 34.
36. Id. at 132-33.
37. See generally Geert Hofstede, Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context,
ONLINE READINGS IN PSYCHOLOGY AND CULTURE 1,1 (Dec. 1, 2011), https://scholarworks.
gvsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1014&context=orpc; Denise Rotondo Fernandez et al.,
Hofstedes Country Classification25 Years Later, 137 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 43, 43 (1997).
38. See generally Kahan, "They Saw a Protest", supra note 31, at 864-65, 869-70; Boonghee Yoo
et al., Measuring Hofstede's Five Dimensions of Cultural Values at the Individual Level: Development

and Validation of CVSCALE, 23 J.

INT'L CONSUMER MKTG.

193, 194-195 (2011).

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
20181

CASE OF MOTIVATED CULTURAL COGNITION

475

Simply stated, a collectivist culture values community interests over
individual interests.39 The group is the priority, with group values and
group coherence protected. In contrast, an individualist culture values
individual interests over collective interests. The individual is the priority,
with individual autonomy and rights to be protected. As Hofstede explains,
this dimension describes the degree to which people are integrated into
groups. 40 For individualists, "ties between individuals are loose: everyone is
expected to look after him/herself."4' Collectivists "from birth onward are
integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups ... that continue protecting [each
other] in exchange for unquestioning loyalty."42
As further revealed by anthropological studies, the two cultural
orientations are associated with distinctly different attributes and beliefs43
Collectivists define themselves in group terms. They are regulated by
groups norms that tend to be homogenous.44 They avoid confrontation,
aspiring instead to remain in harmony in the group.45 They compromise
personal goals if it serves group goals to do so. Individualists are more
detached from group norms; societal norms are more heterogeneous.46
When prioritizing individual interests and goals above group goals, they
often engage in a cost-benefit analysis.47 Confrontation is accepted as part of
natural human dynamics.48
A second important dimension is hierarchical versus egalitarian
orientations. This is also called power distance orientation because this
construct is associated with a society's acceptance of the distribution of
power among groups in society.49 In a hierarchical society, there is a
comfort with class stratifications. Individuals expect that some groups will
have more power, status, and wealth (recognized elites). This stratification
seems reasonable and has certain societal utility, such as predictability and
order. In contrast, an egalitarian society is not as comfortable with unequal
distribution of powers among groups in society. Instead, it theoretically

39. See Harry C. Triandis et al., Multimethod Probes of Individualism and Collectivism, in THE
& CULTURE READER 52, 52-54 (Pat K. Chew ed., 2001); Kahan, "They Saw a
Protest", supra note 31, at 864-65; Hofstede, supra note 37, at 11.
40. Hofstede, supra note 37, at 8.
CONFLICT

41. Id. at 11.
42. Id.
43. See id.; Triandis, supra note 39, at 53.
44. Triandis,supranote 39, at 53.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Hofstede, supra note 37, at 9-10; Jiing-Lih Farh et al., Individual-Level Cultural Values as
Moderators of Perceived Organizational Support-Employee Outcome Relationships in China:
Comparing the Effects of Power Distance and Traditionality, 50 ACAD. MGT. J. 715, 716 (2007).
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aspires to more equal peer relationships. Ideally, power, status, and wealth
are widely dispersed and disparities between groups are minimized.50
Substantial research measures countries' general cultural profiles,
including whether a country is more collectivist versus individualist or
hierarchical versus egalitarian.5' These studies consistently confirm that
Chinese culture is a classic example of collectivist and hierarchical
orientations. 52 For instance, in Hofstede's country comparisons, on a scale
of zero to 100, with 100 being totally individualist and zero being totally
collectivist, China has a score of twenty.53 On a scale of zero to 100, with
100 being totally hierarchical and zero being totally egalitarian, China has a
score of eighty.54
Chinese arbitrators, as prominent members of this culture, intuitively
bring culturally associated attributes to their decision-making roles. As
collectivist-hierarchical oriented, they are motivated to protect their group's
status and their own standing in the group.55 Further, they implicitly
acknowledge that there is a hierarchy of which they are a part and subject to,
including top-down messaging from different levels of government and from
their institutions. Chinese business parties to the dispute also share the same
core cultural values and associated beliefs. In these very fundamental ways,
they are in sync with the Chinese arbitrators.
Foreign parties in these disputes come from countries with a range of core
cultural values, some similar and others quite dissonant from that of Chinese
arbitrators and Chinese parties. As subsequently discussed, U.S. culture
interestingly represents the opposing cultural orientations. In the same way
that China is considered a prime example of collectivist-hierarchical
orientations, the United States is considered a prime example of
individualist-egalitarian orientations.56 Thus, a U.S. party to the dispute is
out of sync in these culturally fundamental ways with the Chinese arbitrators
and Chinese parties.
50. As further explained by Hofstede, "[a]ll societies are unequal, but some are more unequal
than others." This dimension "suggests that a society's level of inequality is endorsed by the
followers as much as by the leaders." Hofstede, supra note 37, at 9.
51. NWhile recognizing that individuals in every national culture vary, these countries' profiles
provide a useful generalized baseline. See e.g., Country Comparison, HOFSTEDE INSIGHTS
[hereinafter Hofstede Insights], available at https://www.hofstede-insights.com/countrycomparison/the-usa/.
52. See e.g., Lei Wang et al., Collectivist Orientation as a Predictor of Affective Organizational
Commitment: A Study Conducted in China, 10 INT'L J. ORG. ANALYSIS 226, 236 (2002).
53. Hofstede Insights, supra note 51.
5 4. Id.
55. This is consistent with the general attributes of these cultural orientations. See Triandis,
supra note 39, at 53 (table describing general attributes of collectivist cultures); Hofstede, supra
note 37, at 9, 11 (tables describing general attributes of collectivist and high-power distance
cultures).
56. Hofstede Insights, supra note 51.
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These inverse cultural frameworks create an inherently complicated and
influential backdrop when disputes arise. Nesbitt summarizes the
differences between relatively interdependent societies, such as China, with
relatively independent societies, such as the United States.57 He notes a
preference for collective action versus an "insistence on individual freedom,"
a "preference for blending harmoniously with the group" versus "individual
distinctiveness," "an acceptance of hierarchy and ascribed status" versus
"egalitarianism and achieved status," and a preference for approaches that
consider context and relationships versus universal rules for proper
behavior.58 By describing these contrasting features, Nesbitt anticipates how
these core cultural values and their attributes shape Chinese arbitrators'
decision-making.
2.

Arbitrators'Decision-making Mechanisms

Motivated cultural cognition theory posits that Chinese arbitrators
unconsciously draw from their core cultural values, such as their collectivist
and hierarchical orientations and use cognitive processes consistent with
those values and associated attributes. As they review and consider the
parties' arguments, they engage in a number of steps. They determine what
information is relevant, which facts are believable, which laws are applicable,
and which decision-making standards are used to resolve the dispute.
These stages in arbitral decision-making conveniently offer arbitrators
opportunities for unconscious cognitive mechanisms used in motivated
cognition because these steps deal with how arbitrators might selectively
access, construct, and evaluate their beliefs."59 For instance, Chinese
arbitrators can use dispute resolution approaches and select decision-making
standards that inadvertently favor one party. In addition, they can determine
that the most credible sources of information are those that are more likely
to support another party. 60

57.

RICHARD

E.

NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: How ASIANS AND WESTERNS

THINK DIFFERENTLY. . AND WHY

68 (2003).

58. Id. at 61-62.
59. Sood, supra note 4, at 309.
60. As consistent with cognitive mechanisms in motivated cognition theory. See id. at 309-10.
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Core Values (such as COllectivismn and
Associated Societal Beliefs (such as
SProtection of Group Norms)
Leading to

Decision Mechanisms (such as Norrs over Technicai ties) and Preferred
Outcomes such as Awards for Culturally Sfmilar Parties)
A careful study of Chinese arbitrators' decision-making reveals
mechanisms that affect how information on the parties' positions are
accessed, constructed, and evaluated. First, arbitrators favor informal
dispute resolution processes. 61 They tend to emphasize norms and flexibility
over technicalities and their rigidity.62 In addition, cultural networking
practices (guanxi) shape how the norms develop and what the norms are. 63
Second, arbitrators prioritize state and institutional authority over parties'
and arbitrators' autonomy. 64
These cognitive mechanisms are natural consequences of the collectivisthierarchical values in the Chinese arbitration process. Taken together, they
also create the Chinese arbitrators' model of justice and ultimately influence
the arbitrators' awards. Consistent with the motivated cultural cognition
framework, these awards are likely to be the arbitrators' preferred outcomes.
a.

Norms and Flexibility Trump Technicalities and Rigidity

Distinctive dispute resolution approaches are long-standing in China.65
Embedded in a highly collectivist culture, these approaches have persisted
through many political changes. Chinese arbitrators and Chinese parties are
61. See CHINESE JUSTICE: CIVIL DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA, sUpra

note 7. This informality also facilities the arbitrators' goal of "harmonious arbitration." Go
WEIXIA,

ARBITRATION

IN

CHINA:

REGULATION

OF

ARBITRATION

AGREEMENTS

AND

PRACTICAL ISSUES 32-33 (2012). Dispute resolution is characterized by traditional Chinese
ideas of "moderation in all things," the "rule of propriety" where the correct relationships

should be preserved and accommodated, and "harmony as valuable." Conflict is seen as a
deviation from harmony that needs to be restored. Consistent with this goal of "harmonious
arbitration," Chinese arbitrators view themselves more as conciliators and mediators than as
adjudicators. They represent the institution or the state. They see their role as helping the
parties to restore balance in their relationship, rather than as adjudicators of each party's rights.
This conception is also consistent with the arbitrators' expansive discretion in their use of

norms and a minimizing of the importance of legal technicalities and literal contract terms, and
subsequently described.
62. Weixia, supra note 61, at 37.

63.
64.
65.
L.A.

Id.
Id. at 38.
See Shi Weisan, Arbitrationand Conciliation:Resolving Commercial Disputes in China, 12 Loy.
INT'L & COMP. L. J. 93, 96 (1989) (dispute resolution as mediation-like); Alison Bailey,
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embedded in that legacy. In very fundamental ways, they share common
premises: informal social and moral norms over technicalities and fairness
principles flexibly applied.
Chinese dispute resolution prefers informal means, such as mediation,
over formal processes, such as litigation.66 Deference to norms is preferred
over deference to rigid rules including legal rules.67 While a traditional
Western view considers laws as guarantors of individual rights, China has a
different history with law.68 Law was a form of unfair and abusive
punishment by the state. 69 Chinese society thus prefers non-legal norms and
values.70 Legal processes and the rigidity of legal rules are viewed as the last
recourse, not the first.7'
Likewise, Chinese arbitrators view contract terms flexibly.72 Contract
terms follow but do not lead the process of dispute resolution. Instead,
judges and arbitrators rely on the principles of heqing, heli, and hefa, which
translate generally to human feelings, principles of reasonableness, and
Chinese laws, in interpreting the contract terms.7 3 This flexibility in the
interpretation of legal rules or contract terms is especially apt if there is a
gap in legislation on the issue or there is ambiguity in the meaning of
contract provisions.74 Arbitrators can then use this "white space" to
interpret the dispute, the law, and the contract in ways that are compatible
with cultural forces and government priorities.75
Consistent with this emphasis on what is fair and reasonable, equitable
and moral principles play an important role in dispute resolution in
traditional China and in arbitration practice more currently. As Fan
describes:
Like the ancient officials (judges) who relied heavily on the unique
features of the special circumstance and on reasonableness to determine
each individual case, today's arbitrators in China also rely heavily on
equitable principles. Law is only one of the factors to be considered to
Living Law: Typicality, Variability and Practicality: The Imperial Chinese Code, Sub-statutes, and
with the author); Brown & Rogers, supra note 11, at 333.

judicial Reasoning (paper on file

66. KuN FAN, ARBITRATION IN CHINA: A LEGAL AND CULTURAL ANALYSIs 181-89 (2013)

(explaining Chinese legal culture and its arbitration practice, including emphasis on ritual of li
over legalism of fa); Karen G. Turner, The Problem of Paradigms,in THE LIMITS OF THE RULE
OF LAW IN CHINA 7 (Karen G. Turner et al. eds., 2000).
67. Fan, supra note 66, at 185-200.
68. To illustrate, the West and China have different conceptions of the rule of law. Id. at 210,
114-15, 234; Turner, supra note 66, at 5.
69. Turner,supra note 66, at 7.
70. Id.
7 1. Id.
72. See e.g., Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially Embedded
Factors in the Transformationfrom Hierarchy to Market, 1978-1989, 5 J. CHINESE L. 143, 216-17
(1991); FAN, supra note 66, at 220-2 1.
73. Fan, supra note 66, at 220.
74. Id. at 172.
75. Id. at 172, 224, 229; Weixia, supra note 61, at 39.
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determine the rights of the parties, together with equity and
reasonableness. In the Chinese saying, 'a just decision must be in
conformity with law and reasonableness' (he li he fa).76
These notions are also incorporated into the Chinese Arbitration Law,
which allows arbitral discretion with its declaration that "disputes shall be
resolved on the basis of facts, in compliance with the law and in an equitable
and reasonable manner."77 Ironically then, Chinese law itself opens the door
to a non-legal normative analysis.
Reviews of awards from early years reveal arbitrators were "keen on
resolving disputes in a way that would result in each disputing party making
a compromise," and thus some "pertinent legal issues may not have been
adequately treated."78 More current research continues to indicate that most
Chinese arbitrators consider fairness quite relevant in their determinations.79
An extensive review of recent Chinese arbitration practices reveals a
continuing marked gap between "laws written on paper" and their
application in actual arbitrations.so
But how are norms of reasonableness and fairness determined?
Historically, Confucian philosophy conveniently offered guidelines on
correct behavior and an order in relationships. 1 The most important bonds
were between "the ruler and the ministers," between key family members,
and between friends.82 These bonds are achieved through loyalty, social
rules, wisdom, and sincerity83
76. Fan, supra note 66, at 209.
77. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhong cai fa (cF$AR Ui
:) [Arbitration Law of
the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Aug. 31, 1994, effective Sept. 1, 1995), art. 7, http://www.npc.gov.cn/wxzl/wxzl/2000-12/05/
content 4624.htm.
78. Guiguo Wang, The Unification of the Dispute Resolution System in China: Cultural, Economic
and Legal Contributions, 13 J. INT'L ARB. 5, 30 (1996).
79. Weixia, supra note 61, at 38 (tentative nature of contract given relations); Fan, supra note
66, at 208 (flexibility in interpreting laws and contract terms), at 227 (indicating Chinese high
tolerance for uncertainty); Randall Pereenboom, Dispute Resolution in China: Patterns, Causes and
Prognosis, 4 EAST ASIA L. REV. 1, 29 (2009).
80. Fan, supra note 66, at 209 (but notion of "finding flexible ways around the laws" is more
likely to lead to less predictable results). See also Peerenboom, supra note 11, at 56 ("The weak
normative force of the law is perhaps to be expected given the many factors that undermine the
authority of law and make it difficult for the populace to accept and respect law as a source of
order in China today. The lurking influence of traditional attitudes toward law as an inferior
albeit necessary means of achieving social order may be one factor. The persistence of an
instrumental view of law whereby law is seen as a tool to be used for whatever purposes the state
deems appropriate surely detracts from the law's moral authority. As does the fact that other
sources of normative order, whether the CCP, local officials, or personal connections, are still
often more important than the law. Moreover, the weakness of the legal system as a whole and
the courts in particular feeds a vicious cycle whereby the legal system is not taken seriously.").
81. Fan, supra note 66, at 192-93.
8 2. Id.
8 3. Id.
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China's culturally engrained guanxi networking practices are derived from
this cultural history and are influential in shaping social norms. Guanxi is
the long-standing social practice of building and utilizing relationships8
These relationships serve as the fundamental units of society.
Guanxi is a natural way of conducting life, including business and work.85
Its networks and the shared insights are integral to the Chinese business and
professional world, including foreign trade and investment. Business
contacts result from personal relations,86 increased information is shared
between guanxi colleagues,87 and executives are more likely to trust those
with whom they have guanxi ties.88 Guanxi may particularly fill a void when
a lack of structural and formal guidelines exists.89
As prominent and successful members in Chinese society and bureaucratic
institutions, Chinese arbitrators have mastered and are themselves integral
to the guanxi system. 90 They are likely involved in business, legal, and
political activities, typically having roles in the commercial and legal
communities, in addition to being arbitrators.91 As members of the elite,
they are vested in common political and economic goals and are linked to
each other.92 Thus, they are particularly inclined to protect the system and
their membership in it.
84. See Chao C. Chen, et. al., Chinese Guanxi: An Integrative Review and New Directionsfor
Future Research, 9 MGMT. ORG. REv. 167 (2010) (meta-review of research on guanxi).
85. Id. at 170, 182.
86. Id. at 192.
87. Id. at 188.
88. Id. at 183. Chinese managers in foreign trade and investment projects are more likely than
American managers to use and maintain guanxi ties. Id. at 192. Likewise, stronger beneficial
effects of guanxi ties were found where the direct foreign investment project had Chinese
partners and Chinese cultural roots. Id. at 187.
89. Id. at 175. Also see the author's consideration of ethical and justice issues prompted by
guanxi networks. Id. at 185, 188-89, 193.
90. Fan, supra note 66, at 127 (relationship between CIETAC and arbitrators), 208-12
(historical and modern emphasis on relations), 221 (aversion to formal dispute resolution), 222
(guanxi integral to social and economic lives and like circles in a lake); Weixia, supra note 61, at
37-38 (closed panel system often drawn from staff who share relations with others in
community); Brown & Rogers, supra note 65, at 335-36; Hughes, supra note 11, at 63 n.2
(noting "foreign" arbitrators are mostly from Hong Kong); Ge Liu & Alexander Lourie,
InternationalCommercialArbitration in China: History, New Developments, and Current Practice, 28
J. MARSHALL L. REv. 539 (1995); Peerenboom, supra note 11 (use of guanxi); William W. Park,
A Fair Fight: Professional Guidelines in InternationalArbitration, 30 J. LONDON CT. INT'L ARB.
409 (2014); Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially Embedded Factors
in the Transformationfrom Hierarch to Market, 1978-1989, 5 J. CHINESE L. 143 (1991).
91. See e.g., CIETAC roster of possible arbitrators at CIETAC Arbitrator Search, http://
www.cietac.org/index.php?g=user&m=arbitrator&a=index&l=en
(last visited July 6, 2018).
Each arbitrator's resume has nationality, gender, education, work experience and expertise; very
few arbitrators are non-Chinese.
92. Strong collectivist culture in China emphasizes the differences between in-groups (e.g.,
Chinese in guanxi network) and out groups (e.g., foreign businesspersons with unclear roles in
Chinese society). Fan, supra note 66, at 210.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
482

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

[VOL. 51, NO. 3

Sharing guanxi networks as well as political and cultural backgrounds,
Chinese arbitrators are likely to identify with the Chinese party's concerns
and perspectives, naturally finding their arguments intuitive and worthy. As
Wexia explains, these relationships have a "delicate psychological impact."93
While not directly relying on their guanxi networks in any particular dispute,
arbitrators' guanxi relationships over time surely shape their perspectives on
the important issues in the type of dispute, the reputations of the parties, and
the credibility of the expert witnesses before them.94
b.

Authority over Autonomy

Arbitrators also determine how to construct and evaluate the arguments
and information presented by the parties. Consistent with both China's
hierarchical and collectivist orientations, arbitrators tend to prioritize
institutional authority over the arbitrators' and parties' autonomy in these
cognitive processes. They can do this in more or less explicit ways. 95
As a top-down socialist system, the Chinese government's stated goals for
nation-building and strengthening the political agenda are clear.96 The link
between a successful economy and successful Chinese involvement in direct
foreign investment and foreign trade also is clear. That means arbitrators'
reaching decisions facilitate, or at least in the aggregate, do not harm
Chinese parties' in their entrepreneurial endeavors.
The relevant administrative entities also communicate, both implicitly and
expressly, these messages. CIETAC, the Chinese institution that
administers Chinese arbitrations, is technically independent of the
government. But it remains part of the China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade (CCPIT), the government agency directed to administer
and develop foreign business and investment.97
Thus, unlike the Western conception of arbitration as bottom-up and
driven by the arbitrators' and parties' autonomy, Chinese arbitration is more
top-down.98 CIETAC and its arbitrators are cognizant of their roles as
quasi-government players in the state's agenda and are motivated to
interpret disputes and the parties' positions consistent with these goals.99
Arbitrators' considerable discretion in interpreting laws and contract terms
and the informality of the arbitration process also allows arbitrators' marked
flexibility in achieving these goals.
93. Weixia, supra note 61, at 39.
94. Arbitrators can filter their perceptions of expertise, credibility, and authority accordingly.
They can "creatively combine accessed knowledge to construct new beliefs that could logically
support the desired conclusion." Kunda, supra note 14, at 485-86.
95. This shifting of criteria is also illustrated in Miron, supra note 23, at 768-79.
96. Fan, supra note 66. Arbitrators, for instance, could unknowingly impose a less-demanding
evidentiary standard on a party whose conduct is consistent with institutional priorities. In
another example, they could judge experts who minimize parties' autonomy as more credible
than those who do not.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 179.
99. Brown & Rogers, supra note 65, at 331; Fan, supra note 66, at 175, 216.
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Further, the Western conception of parties' autonomy, for instance, is that
parties are free to negotiate the specific terms of their relationship and that
those terms will be expressly enforced.100 Thus, their reasonable expectation
is that arbitrators will respect and thus defer to their contract provisions.1ol

But as described earlier, Chinese arbitrators may not give interpret contract
terms as technically or rigidly as the contract's literal terms would indicate.
Instead, contract terms (and, thus, the parties' autonomy in this regard) may
take a back seat to institutional and social priorities.102

3.

Foreign Partiesand Contrasting Decision Mechanisms

But what about the core values and associated attributes of the foreign
parties in these arbitration cases? What if they are neither collectivist nor
hierarchical? To the extent that they contrast from the Chinese arbitrators'
values, as described above, they may presume and expect different decisionmaking standards and reasoning processes than those actually occurring.
As widely studied by comparative social scientists, the Western approach,
as modeled by the United States, tends to be individualist-oriented (focused
on individual interests and rights) and short-term (focused on this
transaction and dispute).103 In addition, the United States emphasizes
egalitarian values. Consistent with these prevalent cultural norms, it is likely
that the U.S. parties (and for that matter, U.S. arbitrators) adhere to these
values in the arbitration process. While they might anticipate decisionmaking mechanisms in sync with their core values, the Chinese arbitrators'
decision-making contrast with those expectations markedly.
For example, while Chinese arbitrators prioritize norms overs
technicalities, the U.S. decision rule would be the reverse. The United
States views laws as important safeguards of individual rights, including
those rights embodied in contracts. 04 Legal rules are expected to trump
social or political norms, thus ensuring the predictability and efficiency upon
which business parties depend. The formalities of dispute resolution also are
associated with due process assurances, so an informal conciliation-oriented
arbitrator again would be contrary to expectations. Similarly, the United
States emphasizes contract terms as the agreement of the parties, believing
that those terms should be strictly followed.105 The contract is viewed as a
reflection of the parties' autonomy to govern their own relationship, without
regard to the cultural or political context in which the parties operate.
100. See generally Charles Fried, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION, (2nd ed. 2015); E. Allan Farnsworth, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS VOL. 1,
199-205 (3rd ed. 2004).
101. Farnsworth, supra note 100, at 17-22.
102. See text accompanying note 76.
103. See e.g., Triandis, supra note 39, at 52; Nisbett, supra note 57; Fan, supra note 66, at
226-27.
104. See Roscoe Pound, The Foundationof Law, 10 AMER. U. L. REv. 124, 129 (1961).
105. See text accompanying notes 103.
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On the other hand, Chinese arbitrators and Chinese parties are embedded
in the guanxi system of relationships, which inevitably influences who and
what the Chinese believe are the most credible and authoritative sources of
information in different types of disputes. The U.S. tendency is to see
arbitration process as a more insulated and isolated process, where decisionmaking is limited to the technical information presented in the arbitration
documents and the parties' arguments in this particular case. Authoritative
sources are "objective" and the traditionally authoritative legal sources, as
recognized by Western conceptions of rule of law.106 Similarly, the
arbitrators' autonomy in decision-making is presumed.107 Explicit or
implicit messaging from the arbitral institution or other superior
government-related entities to arbitrators, for instance, are off-limits. The
process is assumed to be bottom-up rather than top-down.
Thus, Chinese values and their resulting decision mechanisms depart
substantially from what the United States might expect. But how do these
contrasting cultural values and decision mechanisms actually affect
arbitration outcomes? Motivated cultural cognition theory indicates that
Chinese arbitrators would unconsciously be influenced in ways that lead to
their preferred outcomes. The following empirical evidence suggests that
the theory is right on track.
III.

A.

Empirical Study
DESCRIPTION OF STUDY

The author's past study of Chinese international business arbitrations
from 1900-2000 is the first known empirical study of Chinese arbitrations of
international business disputes.10s That study opened the door to the black
box of CIETAC arbitrations specifically and Chinese international
arbitrations more generally. Based on 1,172 cases, randomly sampled from a
comprehensive collection of over 4,000 arbitration awards, the study reveals
characteristics of the disputes, the parties, and the arbitrators' decisionmaking patterns. While these disputes occurred between 1990-2000 and
some CIETAC procedural rules have changed over time, information about
arbitrators' practices remain currently relevant. As explained by recent
studies of Chinese arbitration, arbitrators' approaches to the process, their
reasoning, and their practices are enduring and continue to be prevalent
today.109
106. See e.g., Ann Sinsheimer et al., LEGAL WRITING: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH, 5-12
(2014) (describing U.S. legal system).
107. American Arbitration Association, Rules, Forms & Fees: Commercial Arbitration Rules and
Mediation Procedures, R-18(a)(i) (Oct. 1, 2013), https://adr.org/sites/default/files/
CommercialRulesWeb.pdf ("Any arbitration shall be impartial and independent and ... shall
be subject to disqualification for (i) partiality or lack of independence . . .").
108. Chew, supra note 7 (discussing findings on types of disputes, types of claimants, location of
arbitrations, compositions of arbitral panels, and arbitration outcomes).
109. Fan, supra note 66.
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Among other key results in the author's original study is that Chinese
claimants as a group are more successful than foreign claimants as a group in
their arbitration awards.11o

The current study zooms in on this general

finding of what appears to be a Chinese advantage over foreign parties by
more carefully studying the specific nationalities of the foreign parties. In
particular, it compares the experiences of parties from countries more
culturally similar to China's and countries with cultures more dissonant
from China's. Parties from over fifty countries participated in Chinese
arbitrations."' Finally, this analysis extends and develops the model of
motivated cultural cognition, revealing its far-reaching impact for
international businesses and global economies.
B.

CHINESE CLAIMIANTS ARE BETTER-OFF THAN FOREIGN
CLAIMANTS

Among all cases regardless of parties' nationalities, Chinese arbitrators
have a distinctive decision-making pattern. As shown in Table 1, they are
much more likely to award claimants partial wins than clear-cut win/lose
outcomes. Only 30.5 percent of claimants' awards are either full wins (17
percent) or full losses (13.5 percent).112 In contrast, 69.5 percent of the
awards are compromise partial wins. This decision-making pattern is

110. Chew, supra note 7, at 259, 270.
111. In the interest of confidentiality, CIETAC did not identify the parties in these disputes by
name, but the nationality of the claimants is usually identifiable from the facts of the case.
Foreign parties are almost as likely as Chinese parties to be claimants and respondents. 42.5%
of the claimants are foreign and 57.5% are Chinese. Most typically, one party to a dispute was
Chinese and the other was foreign. Among the claimants, the top groups by nationality in the
study are: China (55%), Hong Kong (21%), USA (4.1%), Japan (2.5%), South Korea (2.4%),
Germany (1.5%), Singapore (1.5%), Taiwan (1.4%), Soviet Union (1%), UK (.9%), and Canada
(.6%). Among the respondents, the top groups by nationality are: China (47.2%), Hong Kong
(23.6%), USA (6.9%), Japan (2.6%), South Korea (3.2%), Germany (1%), Singapore (2.3%),
Taiwan (2.3%), UK (.9%), Canada (1%).
112. If the arbitrators' award consisted of everything the claimant argued for, it was coded as a
"full win;" if the claimant received some but not all of what it wanted, it was coded as a "partial
win;" if the claimant received none of what it wanted, it was coded as a "full loss." Prior studies
on arbitral award patterns sometimes described awards according to the percentage of the
monetary amount of the claim that was awarded (e.g., 1-20%, etc.). This description of awards
in the CIETAC study, however, was not possible or appropriate. While some claimants in
CIETAC arbitrations stated their claims in monetary terms, that was often not the case.
Instead, claimants often asked for some form of specific performance. For instance, in foreign
investment disputes claimants asked for revocation of the joint venture agreement, altering the
management structure, or compliance with the terms on intellectual property exchanges. In
trade disputes, parties claimed, for example, return of the goods or compliance with quality
controls or delivery terms. In other words, it was not possible to objectively quantify or
monetize the claimants' demands or the arbitrations' awards, given the nature and variety of the
claims themselves.
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consistent with "harmonious arbitration" given that arbitrators appeared to
recognize that both sides' position had some merit."1
Viewing partial wins as the arbitrators' default position allows us to turn
our attention to the arbitrators' decision-making patterns on full wins and
full losses. Given our large sample size, we have an ample data set for
analysis of these outcomes. The arbitrators' decision to grant the claimant a
full win or to impose a full loss is very strategically meaningful. From the
claimant's perspective, the ideal outcome is a full win-a total victory
because they got everything they wanted. Its least preferred outcome is a
full loss-a total failure because they received nothing they wanted. Thus,
in viewing claimants in the aggregate (and setting aside partial wins),
claimants are "better off" when they have more full wins andfewer full losses.
In other words, they are more successful. In contrast, claimants in the
aggregate are "worse off" when they have fewer full wins and more full
losses; namely, they would be less successful.
C.

CULTURAL DISSONANCE AND OUTCOMES

Consistent with motivated cultural cognition theory, the hypothesis is that
parties from countries that are culturally similar to China would have results
relatively comparable to the Chinese parties. In other words, these
culturally similar parties would fare about the same as the Chinese parties,
with comparable levels of success (about the same percentages of full-wins
and full losses). Likewise, the hypothesis is that parties from countries that
are culturally dissimilar to China would have different results from the
Chinese parties. Furthermore, we would predict that the more dissimilar
the cultures, the worse-off the parties. In other words, they would have
significantly less full wins and significantly more full losses. As further
explained below and shown in Table 1, the empirical analysis found exactly
what these hypotheses predicted.114

113. See Chew, supra note 7, at 273 (describing Chinese arbitrators' tendency to be more like
mediators).
114. A p value of less than or equal to .05 indicates that the association between the variables is
statistically meaningful, while in contrast, a p value more than .05 indicates that the contrast is
not statistically significant and is more likely to be occurring by chance. See Chew, supra note 7,
at 259, 262-63, 268.
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Table 1: Outcomes by Claimants' Nationality Groups

Chinese
All Foreign
Hong Kong
Developed Countries
U.S.
All Claimants

Partial Wins
N
%

Full Losses
N
%

115
61
30
22
3
176

423
297
160
88
27
720

58
82
29
35
12
140

19.3
13.9
13.7
15.2
7.10
17

71
67.5
73.1
60.7
643
69.5

9.7
18.6
13.2
24.1
28.6
13.5

Totals
N

%

Full Wins
N
%

596
440
219
145
42
1036

100
100
100
100
100
100

P = .00 for all comparisons, except for analysis comparing outcomes for Chinese and Hong
Kong claimants, where p=.09.

1.

Claimantsfrom A Culturally-SimilarCountry

Among the foreign parties in the arbitrations, Hong Kong has the culture
that is most similar to China's. Their residents have a common ancestry and
Hong Kong geographically borders mainland China, with citizens and
businesses seamlessly crossing their border."s During most of Hong Kong's
history, it was considered Chinese territory. Thus, while China technically
categorizes Hong Kong as foreign, the two have much in common.
Most relevant here, these historical commonalities coincide with similar
core values. While there are individuals in every country who do not fit the
dominant cultural norms, the country as a whole identifies with and
demonstrates characteristic values. As shown in Table 2, with a score of
twenty-five (with zero being totally collectivist and 100 being totally
individualist), Hong Kong, like China, is very collectivist. With a score of
sixty-eight (with zero being totally egalitarian and 100 being totally
hierarchical), Hong Kong is similar to but not identical with China,
reflecting a comfort with power distance, but a little less so than China.
Table 2: Values by Countries6

China

Hong Kong
Japan
Germany
U.S.

Collectivism/
Individualism*

Egalitarian/
Hierarchical**

20
25
46
67
91

80
68
54
40
35

* With continuum of Collectivist = 0 and Individualist = 100
** With continuum of Egalitarian = 0 and Hierarchical = 100

115. Marilyn B. Brewer, Multiple Identitiesand Identity Transitions:Implicationsfor Hong Kong, 23
187 (1999) (discussing the blurring of Chinese and Hong Kong
identities); Kim-yee Law & Kim-ming Lee, Citizenship, Economy & Social Exclusion of Mainland
Chinese Immigrants in Hong Kong, 36 J. CONTEMP. AsIA 217 (2007) (dual legacies).
116. Hofstede Insights, supra note 51.
INT'L J. INTERCULTURAL REL.
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Given their similar cultural values, one would predict that Chinese parties
and Hong Kong parties would have fairly similar outcomes. In other words,
the Hong Kong parties' similar values, attributes, and decision standards
would be similar to those of the Chinese arbitrators. Thus, consistent with
motivated cultural cognition, the Chinese arbitrators would unwittingly
access, construct, and evaluate their positions selectively in ways that would
benefit the Hong Kong party. Their identification with similar cognitive
processes would shape the arbitrators' preferred outcome, prompting the
arbitrators to appreciate the Hong Kong parties' positions and arguments,
thereby leaving the other party with a less similarly motivated cultural
cognition process that is disadvantaged by comparison.
The empirical analysis supports this prediction. Chinese claimants and
Hong Kong claimants did not have statistically significant different
outcomes (p=.09); the differences could have occurred by chance. Both
Chinese claimants and Hong Kong claimants did have partial wins about 70
percent of the time. Chinese claimants are more likely to fully win (19.3
percent versus 13.7 percent) and less likely to fully lose (9.7 percent versus
13.2 percent) than Hong Kong claimants, but again, these differences are
not statistically meaningful."7
Moreover, Hong Kong claimants are almost half as likely to receive full
losses than other foreign claimants (13.2 percent versus 24.2 percent).1S
Thus, Hong Kong parties are notably better off than other foreign parties,
suggesting Chinese arbitrators favor them to other foreign parties, although
not quite as much as Chinese parties.
2.

Claimantsfrom Culturally Dissonant Countries

What if the cultures of the foreign parties are markedly different from
China's? What if they are more individualistic and egalitarian? Consistent
with multiple cultural cognition, the hypothesis is that their outcomes would
be dissimilar to the Chinese parties, and further, that they would be less
successful (worse-off) than the Chinese parties.
To offer an incremental cultural contrast, the study initially considers
outcomes for the parties from developed countries and then follows with a
study of the outcomes from U.S. parties alone. Developed countries are
industrialized, capitalist countries within the Western European and U.S.
"sphere of influence."119 As compared to the Chinese arbitrators and
Chinese parties, parties from developed countries are from countries with
economic, political, and cultural values different from and fundamentally
contrary to China's. But they do not have all the same identical values.
There is some heterogeneity, for instance, with this group including
Germany, Japan, and the United States.
117. See Chew, supra note 7, at 258-59.
118. Id.
119. NATIONS ONLINE, COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, Countries of the First World, http://
www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/firstworld.htm (last visited July 6, 2018).
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As shown in Table 2, as examples of developed countries, Germany, Japan,
and the United States are all notably more individualist-oriented than
China, although the three counties illustrate a range on this dimension. The
United States has the more extreme individualist orientation. Similarly,
Germany, Japan, and the United States are also more egalitarian than China,
with Germany and the United States being the most egalitarian and Japan
being somewhat more hierarchical than the other two developed countries.
As predicted, the difference in arbitration outcomes for Chinese parties
versus the outcomes for parties from the developed countries is highly
significant. It was particularly more likely-well over twice as likely-for
developed countries claimants than Chinese claimants to fully lose (24
percent versus 9.7 percent).120 Outcomes for claimants in general and for
developed countries claimants also contrasted. Further, claimants from
developed countries are worse off than claimants in general, fully losing
almost twice as often (24 percent versus 13.5 percent).121 In other words,
parties from developed countries are not as successful as Chinese parties.
3.

Chinese and U.S. Claimants

China and the United States have the most markedly contrasting core
cultural values.122 Unlike the comparison with developed countries, where
the countries represented a range of cultural values, the United States offers
a direct head-to-head comparison. Among the countries considered, no two
countries offer more of a contrast in these core values. With China's score
of twenty and the United States' score of ninety-one, China is very
collectivist-oriented, and the United States is very individualist-oriented.
The contrast between hierarchical and egalitarian is also marked, although
not quite as dramatic. With China's score of eighty and the United States'
score of thirty-five, China is hierarchical, and the United States is more
egalitarian than hierarchical, but not as extremely so.
Consistent with motivated cultural cognition, the hypothesis is that the
outcomes would reflect this cultural dissonance more dramatically than the
developed countries comparison. The empirical analysis strongly supports
this prediction. First, as shown in Illustration 1 below, Chinese and U.S.
claimants have very different outcome patterns: Chinese claimants are much
more likely to get full wins (19 percent) and much less likely to get full losses
(9.7 percent)-the best-off position. In contrast, U.S. claimants are much
less likely to get full wins (7.1 percent) and much more likely to get full
losses (28 percent of the time)-the worst-off position.
120. See id.; Chew, supra note 7, at 258.
121. See NATIONS ONLINE, supra note 119; Chew, supra note 7, at 258.
122. Despite these differences, China and the U.S. have been long-time trade and investment
partners. In the formative 1990s, U.S. companies were among the first to trade and invest in
China. Many U.S. companies believed in the upside profit potential of doing business with
China, despite the considerable political and economic risks. Brown & Rogers, supra note 65, at
331-32.
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Illustration 1: Outcomes by Claimants Nationality
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As compared to all foreign parties and even to developed countries
claimants, U.S. claimants have the worst outcomes. U.S. claimants are more
likely to fully lose (28.6 percent versus 18.6 percent of all foreign claimants
and 24.1 percent of developed countries) and less likely to fully win (7.1
percent versus 13.9 percent of all foreign claimants and 15.2 percent of
developed countries). Thus, considering all the data and analyses above,
Chinese arbitrators award Chinese claimants the most favorable outcomes
and U.S. claimants the least favorable outcomes of any other group analyzed
in this study. In particular, Chinese arbitrators very infrequently give U.S.
claimants full wins. In these ways, U.S. claimants are the most
disadvantaged of any group of claimants.
In summary, the study shows that Chinese parties have better award
outcomes than foreign parties. Assuming that all cases are comparably
meritorious, these findings suggest Chinese parties have systemic
advantages. But the degree of differences in outcomes varies with the
nationalities of the foreigners. There is less difference between Chinese
claimants and those from Hong Kong, for instance. In contrast, there are
greater differences between Chinese claimants and those from developed
countries, with a particularly dramatic disparity between outcomes for
Chinese and U.S. claimants.
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Illustration 2: Relationship Between Cultural Dissonance and
Outcomes
Structurally
Similar
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Worst-Off
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As depicted in Illustration 2, our general hypothesis, consistent with
motivated cultural cognition, also is supported. As cultural divergence
between Chinese core values and a foreign party's core values increases, the

Chinese arbitrators' motivated cultural cognition processes is more likely to
disfavor those parties. More substantively, motivated cultural cognition
theory offers an explanation for Chinese arbitrators' decision-making in
these international business disputes and provides insights on their sense of
justice.
III.
A.

Discussion and Conclusions
CHINESE ARBITRATIONS AND MOTIVATED CULTURAL
COGNITION

While American businesspeople and lawyers may describe Chinese

international arbitration as an impossible-to-understand black box, this
article finds that it may not be such a mystery after all. Motivated cultural
cognition theory posits that Chinese arbitrators are unwittingly motivated
by core cultural values and subsequent decision rules (cognitive mechanisms)
that lead to their preferred outcomes; their process is normed by their
culture.
Consider, for example, the following sample disputes:
Dispute One is between a Chinese manufacturer and a United States
(U.S.) purchaser over a number of interrelated issues: The U.S.
purchaser argues that the products (electronic toys) do not meet
specified product quality specifications and the shipments missed
original delivery schedule, thereby resulting in a decrease in profits
(given customer cancellations). It argues a clear violation of their sales
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agreement, so they want damages and threaten the termination of the
agreement.
The Chinese manufacturer offers all kinds of explanations, both internal
(e.g., labor shortages) and external (e.g., unexpected storms delaying
shipments), for product results and delayed shipments that do not
technically comply although closely approximates contract terms. It argues
these are all small problems inherent in the learning curve for foreign
manufacturing and overseas shipment. It notes the parties' history of brief
but good relations, and both parties' desire to continue to grow their
businesses in this emerging industry.
Further, the Chinese party complains that the U.S. purchaser's payments
are less than anticipated and slower than required for its seasonal business
operations. The U.S. purchaser explains that volatile international currency
exchange rates resulted in "effective" lowering and unforeseen complications
in Chinese banking relationships and regulations have delayed payments.
The U.S. party sees itself as a more experienced trader; the Chinese party as
less sophisticated. The Chinese party thinks the U.S. party should have
been clearer about external contingencies. Since it was not, it should be
liable.
The Chinese parties' arguments in Dispute One are consistent with the
Chinese arbitrators' cultural values and their cognitive mechanisms. It
emphasizes social norms-doing what is fair and reasonable in these
circumstances. It focuses on the parties' past and future relationship and
what makes sense for direct foreign investment and foreign trade business
(the success of which would benefit all concerned). Their guanxi networks
help inform these norms and the needs of specific industries. In contrast,
the U.S. party makes familiar arguments about strict enforcement of
contract terms and legal principles. These technical arguments, however,
while very consistent and persuasive to U.S. legal decision-makers, are not
consistent with Chinese cultural values or persuasive to Chinese arbitrators.
Dispute Two is between joint venture partners who are feuding over the
use of intellectual property (IP). The U.S. IP owner claims that the
Chinese partner breached the licensing agreement by exceeding its use
of the IP. (The licensing agreement is part of their broader joint
venture arrangement.) The U.S. partner relies on specific contractual
language and the general IP legal principles recognized in international
treaties among Western countries. It thinks it important to clarify and
enforce performance standards as specified in the licensing agreement,
setting precedent for the future. It wants an injunction and damages.
The Chinese partner explains that its use of the IP was consistent
with both parties' common goals for an ultimately successful joint
venture and the assumed trust in their relationship. In fact, it is good
news that business development was progressing so quickly that the IP
was utilized earlier and more extensively than anticipated. Also, the
Chinese party has its own counterclaims under emerging Chinese IP
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law. It complains that the U.S. partner did not provide to them
adequate training on the IP's use, and the U.S. party's proposed
restrictiveness of its IP would substantially handicap the joint venture.
Also, the U.S. party has not experienced real economic harm.
While both parties in Dispute Two agree that the joint venture is entitled
to some IP, they disagree about the scope and terms of the use. Once again,
the U.S. party presents technical legal and contract arguments, believing
that should be the basis for the arbitrator's resolution. Recognizing that this
is an international dispute, it cites international IP treaties. The U.S. party,
consistent with U.S. IP law, views IP as a resource to be protected and
restricted, with fears of others' exploitation. The Chinese arbitrators and
Chinese parties, however, have a differing cultural perspective of IP. They
see it as a valuable resource for the partners to tap and a compliment to the
IP owner when it is used. They think more contextually and in the longer
term about the success of their relationship and the joint venture, rather
than isolating this specific immediate resource issue-in fact, the Chinese
party wonders why the U.S. party would want to create obstacles to what
appears to be very promising business venture for all.123
The empirical study of over 1,000 cases confirms this phenomenon.
Further, it constructs an arbitration theorem of cultural similarity and
dissonance: when arbitrators and a given party have similar cultural values
and approaches to decision-making, the party fares better in arbitration;
when cultural values and decision-making approaches diverge, the party
fares worse. The result of this for business disputes in which the claimants
are either Chinese or U.S., is that Chinese parties have the best outcomes
and U.S. parties the worst.
Yet, Chinese arbitrators have strong incentives to appear as neutral as
possible. Arbitrators must maintain their credibility so that the Chinese
arbitral institution CIETAC and the parties find them acceptable and select
them for their disputes. CIETAC's positive reputation is inevitably
enhanced by arbitrators creating a good impression, which is dependent in
part on all parties evaluating them as highly competent and fair. The
importance of CIETAC's stature is further underscored by increasing
numbers of competing arbitral forums. Given all these factors, Chinese
arbitrators are likely to be very deliberative and systematic in their
consideration of the dispute and the parties' arguments. Thus, the impact of
motivated cultural cognition on the disproportionately positive outcomes for
Chinese parties is even more notable.
Whether Chinese arbitrators' decision-making is problematic depends on
one's vantage point. Consider, for instance, the vantage points of U.S.
parties. Their presumed first reaction is that Chinese arbitrators are biased
and unfair. Outcomes should not differ by the nationalities of the parties,
and if they do, that is prima facie evidence of corrupt decision-makers.
123. See generally
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Chinese arbitrators' decision mechanisms, influenced by accumulated guanxi
experiences and state priorities, are contrary to the established rules of law
established by Western jurisprudence.
But Chinese and Hong Kong parties may react more moderately. While
not necessarily agreeing with all of the Chinese arbitrator's decision
mechanisms, they approach them within the context of Chinese history,
culture, and jurisprudence. This pattern likely extends beyond China, with
parties in other countries also benefiting from an arbitration "home court
advantage." Among American arbitrators, for instance, the core cultural
values of individualism and egalitarianism likely result in associated decision
mechanisms and preferred outcomes for American parties.
When arbitration awards are announced, what determines whether the
parties object or accept the decision? Perhaps, parties' reactions are
outcome-driven. That is, if the arbitrators' decision-making process yields
generally favorably outcomes for party X, then party X is inclined to accept
that decision-making process as credible. If on the other hand, the process
yields generally unfavorable outcomes for party X, then party X is inclined
to critique that process and find it problematic.
Another explanation is that parties' evaluations are culture-driven,
particularly shaped by cultural similarity and cultural dissonance. That is, if
party X's cultural values are similar to the arbitrator's cultural values and its
manifestations in the arbitrator's decision mechanisms, then party X is more
inclined to find the arbitrator's reasoning, and therefore, his or her award
outcome, more acceptable. In contrast, if party X's cultural values are
dissonant to the arbitrator's, then party X will likely disagree with the
arbitrator's reasoning and the award outcomes. Following this logic, a
culturally dissonant party would be more inclined to find the process
offensive and call for reforms.
Both the outcome-driven and culture-driven explanations are indeed
consistent with the U.S. parties' and developed countries' expected rejection
and the Chinese and Hong-Kong parties' general acceptance of the Chinese
arbitrators' decision-making process. Indeed, as is true in so many facets of
business and life, one's assessment of fairness, reasonableness, and justice
ultimately depends on who is asking the question.
B.

STRATEGIC CONCERNS

Regardless of the answer to this difficult jurisprudential inquiry, Chinese
arbitrators and foreign investors still face practical strategic concerns. For
instance, Chinese arbitrators and Chinese arbitral institutions may be
concerned about their reputation, given motivated cultural cognition theory
and the empirical findings described in this article. If so, what can they do?
Two possible strategies follow.
The first strategy is to defend and justify the existing dispute resolution
approach, including the core cultural values and cognitive mechanisms.
Every international arbitration forum has distinctive features, and savvy
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parties learn about and adjust to those features. In the United States, for
instance, lawyers are adept at considering the jurisprudential practices of
every state in which they practice. To the extent there are differences in
outcomes, motivated cultural cognition theory indicates they are not
intentional but rather preconscious applications of culture. China's distinct
dispute resolution approaches may be especially appropriate for some parties
and some disputes. In fact, some may encourage Chinese arbitrators and
CIETAC to embrace its distinctiveness, and to give notice of its features so
that informed parties can take advantage of them.
The second, possibly concurrent, approach is for Chinese arbitrators and
Chinese arbitral institutions to pause, evaluate, and consider reforms. Given
this study's results, they could learn more about how motivated cultural
cognition affects their decision-making. Making transparent political and
cultural influences may minimize their impact in decision-making.124
Studying the arbitrators' decision-making process may prompt discussions
on whether and how to expand its decision mechanisms to reflect a broader
range of cultural values. Expanding the roster of arbitrator candidates to
include more diversity of all kinds, including arbitrators' nationalities, would
broaden arbitrators' cultural values. Being actively involved in forums and
organizations dedicated to improving the quality of international arbitration,
while respecting cultural differences, could also be a constructive step.
Foreign investors, particularly those from the United States, on the other
hand, want to know how to counter their apparent disadvantage in Chinese
international arbitrations. They can consider these strategies:
1.

Informed Participantin Process

Be as informed as possible about the choice of arbitral forum and potential
arbitrators. To the extent there are choices as to forum, be knowledgeable
about the differences. Even if you are limited to CIETAC, there are dozens
of possible CIETAC arbitrators including a handful of non-Chinese ones.1 25
Do your due diligence regarding their varied qualifications and inclinations.
Given their particular backgrounds, ascertain to what extent they might
adhere to core cultural values, institutional and state commitments, and the
decision mechanisms described in this article.
2.

CulturalAdeptness

Become part of Chinese culture, or at least more culturally adept. Work
toward being "honorary" members of relevant guanxi networks. When
appropriate, select Chinese partners who are well-connected and regarded.
Research indicates that Chinese-foreign joint ventures benefit from their
Chinese partners who utilize their guanxi networks on behalf of the
124. See Sood & Darley, supra note 17, at 1313.
125. For a roster of prospective arbitrators, see CIETAC Arbitrator Search, supra note 91.
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business.126 Be respectful and view Chinese lawyers and businesspeople as
peers.
Learn more about Chinese cultural values and how they translate to
business practices and dispute resolution. As in any dispute resolution
process, understanding the decision-makers' logic (cognitive mechanisms)
can help you shape your arguments so they are optimally persuasive. In
other words, make arguments and take positions that make sense to Chinese
arbitrators, rather than self-righteously defending your views. For example,
in what ways are your arguments compatible with Chinese or emerging
Chinese-foreign social norms?
3.

Innovating or Minimizing Culturally-Shaped Decision Mechanisms

Consider if there are ways to introduce alternative decision-making
standards and mechanisms or to minimize the impact of cognitive
mechanisms that are harmful to your position. Consider if contract terms
can be drafted with such clarity and mutual benefit that arbitrators do not
have discretion in their interpretation. Consider working with other
interested groups, including professional Chinese arbitration groups, on new
arbitral practices and decision-making standards that serve everyone's
interests. Working with other international arbitration groups may also be
productive. The common aspirational goal could be identifying and
implementing common values for international arbitration that are
respectful of all kinds of cultures.

126. See Chen, supra note 84, at 187.

PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW

